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THE NINTH AMENDMENT AND
INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS: A REPLY TO
PROFESSOR MCAFFEE
Daniel A. Farber*
The editors of the Nevada Law Review have very graciously invited me to
reply to Professor McAffee’s essay review, The “Foundations” of AntiFoundationalism–Or, Taking the Ninth Amendment Lightly: A Comment on
Daniel A. Farber’s Book on the Ninth Amendment.1 As readers may infer from
his title, Professor McAffee is not a fan of my book.2 This does not come as a
surprise, however, because he has previously advocated a quite different view
of the Amendment.3
As he explained in an earlier work, Professor McAffee views the Ninth
Amendment as being designed to negate a possible inference–that inference
being that adopting a bill of rights “would reverse the Constitution’s premise
that all not granted was reserved; instead, the government would hold all power
except what was prohibited in the bill of rights.”4 This seems to me a somewhat strained reading of the text of the Ninth Amendment.5 Could not clearer
language have been used if the Amendment was aimed at limiting federal
power or protecting the reserved powers of the states?
Such language is not only conceivable, it was actually considered by Congress and rejected. Madison’s proposal for the Bill of Rights had contained
language speaking directly about federal powers. His version of the Ninth
Amendment read:
The exceptions here or elsewhere in the Constitution, made in favor of particular
rights, shall not be so construed as to diminish the just importance of other rights
retained by the people, or as to enlarge the powers delegated by the Constitution; but
either as actual limitations of such powers, or as inserted merely for greater caution.6
* Sho Sato Professor of Law, University of California, Berkeley.
1 Thomas B. McAffee, The “Foundations” of Anti-Foundationalism–Or, Taking the Ninth
Amendment Lightly: A Comment on Daniel A. Farber’s Book on the Ninth Amendment, 9
NEV. L.J. 226 (book review).
2 DANIEL A. FARBER, RETAINED BY THE PEOPLE: THE “SILENT” NINTH AMENDMENT AND
THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS AMERICANS DON’T KNOW THEY HAVE (2007) [hereinafter
FARBER, “SILENT” NINTH AMENDMENT].
3 See Thomas B. McAffee, The Original Meaning of the Ninth Amendment, 90 COLUM. L.
REV. 1215 (1990).
4 Id. at 1226.
5 “The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or
disparage others retained by the people.” U.S. CONST. amend. IX. Also, the original Constitution already protected certain rights (e.g., the Bill of Attainder and ex post facto clauses),
so this inference was not limited to the Bill of Rights. Id. art. I, § 9, cl. 3.
6 James Madison, Speech to the House of Representatives Proposing Constitutional Amendments (June 8, 1789) reprinted in DANIEL A. FARBER & SUZANNA SHERRY, A HISTORY OF
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The italicized language about federal powers was deleted from the final
version of the Amendment, leaving only the reference to individual rights. If
the focus had been on the scope of federal power, the revisions would have
been in the opposite direction: to keep this language about powers and delete
the language about retained rights.
Of course, one snippet of history is not conclusive, though the drafting
history of a constitutional provision seems unusually probative as historical evidence goes. But, at least readers should agree that it is not implausible to read
the Amendment as being about the same kinds of individual rights found in the
previous eight amendments, rather than being about federal powers.
I would like to address three other points briefly. First, Professor McAffee
characterizes me as a “rights-foundationalist”–meaning someone who believes
that the “American constitution is concerned, first and foremost” with protecting rights.7 I’m not sure what leads him to that conclusion. In fact, I think the
main purpose of the Constitution is to empower the federal government–indeed, this seems to me to be beyond dispute.8 On the other hand, I do
think that the purpose of the Bill of Rights is–not too surprisingly–to protect
rights.9
Second, Professor McAffee seems to think the Ninth Amendment, if
viewed as providing enforceable protection at all, must be interpreted as a
moral injunction rather than a legal one, so that all the usual tools used by
judges in constitutional cases become irrelevant.10 Yet, this was not the way
that moral reasoning was generally used by the Framers,11 nor is it how the
Supreme Court has gone about protecting fundamental rights under the Fourteenth Amendment.12 I see no reason why the Ninth Amendment should be
immune from the normal tools of legal thought. In my view, Professor McAffee’s inability to imagine that moral considerations could be part of legal reasoning is the barrier that makes it so difficult for him to understand the very
different world views of the Framers and of those he derides as rights fundamentalists today.
Finally, Professor McAffee suggests that if taken seriously, my view of
the Ninth Amendment would imply that moral rights would legally trump even
the Constitution itself.13 Perhaps I was not clear enough about this point in my
THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 323, 326 (2d ed. 2005) (emphasis added). For the rejected
language preserving governmental powers, see id. at 326-27.
7 McAffee, supra note 1, at 227 & n.3.
8 See DANIEL FARBER, LINCOLN’S CONSTITUTION 39-42 (2003). If the main purpose had
been to limit federal power and uphold state sovereignty, the Framers could just as well have
stuck with the Articles of Confederation. Perhaps I should say that the immediate goal was
to strengthen the federal government, this in turn was in the service of the broader purposes
set forth in the Preamble. Id. at 40. Securing the “Blessings of Liberty” was one of those
purposes, but not the only one. U.S. CONST. pmbl.
9 I also think that this is the primary purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment; what else could
guarantees of due process, equal protection, and privileges and immunities be other than
protections of rights? U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
10 McAffee, supra note 1, at 239-242. This is the theme of part IV of the essay review.
11 See FARBER, “SILENT” NINTH AMENDMENT, supra note 2, at 21-27.
12 See id. at 8-82, 88-90.
13 McAffee, supra note 1, at 241-242.
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recent Ninth Amendment book, but it is one that I have discussed elsewhere.14
In general, the law of nations made interstitial use of natural law, but acknowledged that it could be overridden by positive law.15 Thus, to the extent that
some constitutional provisions might be viewed as inconsistent with moral
rights–and I assume Professor McAffee would agree that (say) the Fugitive
Slave Clause fits this description–they would simply override any natural rights
so far as courts and government officials were concerned. The position that
Professor McAffee criticizes is not exactly a straw man but it is not the position
that I myself take, nor one that the Americans of the Eighteenth and Nineteenth
Centuries would have taken.
My purpose here is not to prove my views of these matters or disprove
Professor McAffee’s. These issues are far too complex to make that feasible.
Readers who want to dig more deeply into the details should turn to Professor
McAffee’s earlier writings and to my book. Instead, I have tried here to clarify
my position and to explain why some views that seem self-evident to Professor
McAffee strike me as contestable.

14 FARBER & SHERRY, supra note 6, at 375 (for moderates likes Lincoln, “natural law was
like the law of nations, interstitial and capable of being displaced by positive law”).
15 See id. at 371-75.
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